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CHILD SNATCHING: REMEDIES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS
During the past few decades the divorce rate in the United States has risen
significantly.' Today divorce and separation occur nearly as frequently as
marriage.2 Because of the increase in failed marriages the number of children
affected by divorce has escalated. 3 While some parents resolve custody arrangements amicably, the custody decision frequently embroils the family in
lengthy and bitter court battles.' The turmoil surrounding a custody dispute
5
can prompt either parent to resort to self-help by abducting his or her child.
Child snatching occurs when a parent deliberately retains or conceals a child
from the other parent., The traditional civil remedies and criminal penalties
for child snatching neither assisted the custodial parent in recovering his or
her child nor acted as a deterrent to parental kidnapping. 7 Recently, however,

1. See STATSTICAL ABSTRACT OF TE UNITED STATES, 1982-83 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 41 (103rd ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as STATISnCAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES]. In 1960, 74% of the population 18 years old and older were married while
2.45 % were divorced. Id. In 1981, 65.1 % of adults were married and 6.65% were divorced, more
than two and one-half times the number divorced in 1960. Id.
2. See P. HoFF, J. SCHULMAN, A. WOLENIK, J. O'DANIEL, INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY
DisPuTEs AND PARENTAL KrGNAPPINo: Poucy, PRACTICE AND LAW 1-1 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as P. HoFF & J. SCHrLMN] (American adults divorce almost as often as they marry); STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF Tim UNrrm) STATES, supra note 1, at 41. In 1950, fewer than one out of four marriages
ended in divorce. Id. In 1979, nearly half of all marriages ended in divorce. Id.
3. Hoff, Child Snatching-The Destructive Game of Hide and Seek, I CHLD LEGAL RTS.
J. 4, 5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Child Snatching] (quoting Divorce, Child Custody and Child
Support, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS (1978)). The number of children
whose parents were divorced tripled in two decades, rising from 361,000 in 1956 to 1,117,000
in 1976. Id.
4. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (E.D. Wis.) (custody hearings
spanned one year time period), aff'd, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d
1039, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (litigation on custody issues continued for two years); M. WHEELER,
No FAULT DivORCE 72 (1974) (more than one-third of divorces that involve children are followed
by further litigation on custody issue).
5. See ParentalKidnapping Prevention Act: Joint Hearingson S. 105 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Child
and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (January 30, 1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Hearings] (statement of Tom Alexander,
Jr. on behalf of Men's Equality Now of the U.S.A. and Male Parents for Equal Rights, and
statement of Donald Clevenger on behalf of Fathers United for Equal Rights and U.S. Divorce
Reform) (noting that male as well as female custodial parents suffer trauma of losing children
through child snatching).
6. See Child Snatching, supra note 3, at 5 (child snatching occurs when child is illegally
denied access to one parent by unilateral actions of other parent).
7. See S. KATz, Camw SNATCHING: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE ABDUCTION OF CHILDREN
14 (1981) [hereinafter cited as S. KIAz] (child snatching may occur either before or after court
grants custody decree). In the predecree context, a parent who fears he will lose permanent custody
of a child might flee with the child to another state to evade the original jurisdiction of the court.
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federal courts have opened new avenues to parents by permitting commonlaw tort actions for child snatching. 8 Moreover, federal courts have awarded
significant damages to parents deprived of the legal custody of their children. 9
During the last decade, child snatching incidents reached epidemic
proportions.' Until 1980 the legal system did not deter parental kidnapping."
Several factors contributed to the legal environment that allowed child snatching
to flourish.'" First, the Supreme Court has not interpreted the full faith and
credit clause' 3 of the United States Constitution to require states to recognize
custody orders entered by other state courts." In New York ex rel. Halvey
See Child Snatching, supra note 3, at 5. In the post decree situation, the parent who loses the
custody battle might abduct the child to relitigate the guardianship issue in a new forum. See
S. KATz, supra, at 11. According to recent estimates, between 25,000 and 100,000 children are
victims of child snatchings each year. See 1980 Hearings, supra note 5, at 6 (statement of Sen.
M. Wallop, sponsor of S. 105); Wallop, Children of Divorce and Separation, 15 TRIAL LAW.
34, 35 (1979) (citing statistics on child snatching).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 116-44 (discussing common-law tort actions for child
snatching in federal courts).
9. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Wis.) (father awarded more than
$125,000 for loss of companionship of daughter resulting from abduction by mother), aff'd,
694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982); Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (mother
awarded $100,000 in punitive damages for emotional distress stemming from abduction of son).
10. See 1980 Hearings, supra note 5, at 6 (statement of Sen. M. Wallop) (estimating that
between 25,000 and 100,000 child snatchings occur each year).
11. See Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MIcH. L. Rav. 795, 814 (1964)
(lack of uniformity among state jurisdictional standards encourages child snatching); Foster &
Freed, Child Snatching and Custodial Fights: The Case for the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 28 HAsTiNGs L.J. 1011, 1012-15 (1977) (discussing conflicting jurisdictional rules of
states, lack of application of full faith and credit clause to custody decrees, and lack of finality
in custody orders as contributing to problem of child snatching).
12. See Lansing & Sherman, The Legal Response to Child Snatching, 7 J. Juv. LAw 16,
16-17 (1983) (legal system has encouraged child snatching); see also infra notes 13-47 and accompanying text (explaining three major factors for increase in child snatching).
13. See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. Article IV of the United States Constitution provides
that each state shall accord full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of other states. Id. The full faith and credit clause is one of the underlying concepts
of federalism. See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935). Through
the full faith and credit clause the framers of the Constitution sought to promote national unity
and to preclude litigants from forum shopping. Id.; Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948).
The full faith and credit clause prevents dissatisfied claimants from pursuing a continuous pattern of vexatious litigation after one state has reached a decision on the merits of a case. Kovacs
v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 611 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Additionally, the full faith
and credit clause promotes continuity in the law by requiring interstate recognition of judicial
decrees. See generally Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49
COLuM. L. REv. 153 (1949) (discussing purposes of full faith and credit clause).
14. See Note, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act: Dual Response to Interstate Child Custody Problems, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
149, 150-51 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Dual Response to Child Custody Problems]. The United
States Supreme Court's reluctance to apply full faith and credit to child custody decrees has
fostered increased custody litigation, encouraged child stealing, and subjected families to emotional
and psychological stress. See id. at 150-51. The United States Supreme Court has declined to
extend full faith and credit to child custody decrees on four occasions. Id. at 150 n.4 (citing
Supreme Court's reasoning in denying full faith and credit); see Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187,
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v. Halvey," the Supreme Court held that custody decrees are not final but

remain subject to modification by the courts.1 6 The Halvey Court reasoned
that a state court may modify a custody order if the welfare of the child or
a change in circumstances warrants a modification of the custody decree.' 7
Consequently, the Halvey Court ruled that custody orders do not have res
judicata effect either in the issuing state or in any other state.' 8 The Court
reasoned that if state law entitles one state to modify a custody decree then
other states with proper jurisdiction over a child also may alter the custody
order.

9

As a result of the Supreme Court's failure to apply the full faith and
credit clause to custody decrees, any state court had the authority to make

an initial grant of custody or modify an existing custody order so long as
the parties met the requirements for personal jurisdiction.20 Traditionally, states
exercised jurisdiction in custody cases based on either the child's legal domicile,
2
the child's presence in the state, or personal jurisdiction over both parents. '
194 (1962) (full faith and credit clause does not bar state courts from relitigating child custody
decrees when changed circumstances may affect child's best interests); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356
U.S. 604, 607-08 (1958) (custody decrees are not final and may be relitigated); May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1953) (state not bound by due process clause to honor custody decree
from sister state lacking in personam jurisdiction over parent); New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey,
330 U.S. 610, 615 (1947) (concern for welfare of children given greater weight than demand for
full faith and credit). In two recent cases the Supreme Court declined to address the issue of
application of the full faith and credit clause to state child custody determinations. See Webb
v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493, 495 (1981) (plaintiff barred from raising full faith and credit issue on
appeal since neither party raised constitutional claim at state court level); Eicke v. Eicke, 399
So. 2d 1231, 1236 (Louisiana court not required to recognize Texas custody decree issued to
father when children resided in Louisiana and Louisiana court had rendered decree awarding
custody to mother), reh'g denied, 406 So. 2d 607 (1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 970 (1982),
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 103 S. Ct. 776 (1983).
15. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
16. See id. at 613-15 (custody decrees not entitled to res judicata effect).
17. See id. at 612-13. See generally UNIF. MARRiAoE A
DIVORCE ACT § 409, 9A U.L.A.
211-12 (1979) (court may modify custody decree if change in child's circumstances warrants
modification).
18. See 330 U.S. at 613.
19. See id. at 614.
20. See id. at 615.

21. See RESTATEMENT (SECoND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 79 (1971) (jurisdiction may be based

on child's domicile within state, child's physical presence in state, or state of origin of custody
decree). Historically, a state court asserted jurisdiction in a child custody case only if the child
was domiciled within the state or if the state was the child's permanent home. See Goodrich,
Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 2 (1921) (child's permanent place of
residence determines jurisdiction). Domicile is defined as the principal place of establishment
in which a person presently intends to remain. See H. CLARK, THE LAw OF DOMEsTIC RELATIONS
N THE UNITED STATES § 4.1, at 144 (1968). A child's domicile traditionally depended on the
domicile of the father since the court viewed the father as the child's natural guardian. See Goodrich,
supra, at 4. Jurisdiction in early custody cases, therefore, often depended on the father's place
of residence. Id. Courts over the years expanded the basis for jurisdiction in custody cases. See,
e.g., Sharpe v. Sharpe, 77 Ill. App. 2d 295, -, 222 N.E.2d 340, 342 (1966) (mother's removal
of child from state did not preclude court of original jurisdiction from hearing father's subsequent petition to modify custody decree); Jackson v. Jackson, 241 S.C. 1, 3, 126 S.E.2d 855,
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Since a child could be domiciled in one state but physically present in another,
two state courts could exercise jurisdiction simultaneously.22 Conflicting custody
orders frequently resulted.23 The Court's failure to extend full faith and credit

to custody decrees provided dissatisfied parents with an incentive to seize their
children and flee to another state. 2' The success of absconding parents in obtaining new custody orders reinforced the incentives for child snatching.25
The second factor that contributed to the child snatching epidemic involved the states' use of the parenspatriaepower to intervene in a child custody
27
dispute. 26 Under the doctrine ofparenspatriae
the state has a direct interest
862 (1962) (court has jurisdiction to award custody even though parent removed child from state
prior to divorce action). Until recently, courts permitted parents to sue for custody in almost
any state despite a lack of significant contacts between the child and the particular state. See
UmF. CHmD CUSTODY JURIsDICTIoN ACT, 9 U.L.A. 111, 112 (1979) (Commissioners' Prefatory
Note) (discussing need for more restrictive jurisdictional standards among states in child custody
cases).
22. Compare Stout v. Pate, 261 P.2d 788, 791 (Cal. App.) (1953) (California court granted
custody of children to mother), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 968 (1954) with Stout v. Pate, 209 Ga.
786, -,
75 S.E.2d 748, 749 (1953) (Georgia state court awarded custody of children to father),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 968 (1954); see also Moniz v. Moniz, 298 P.2d 710, 713 (Cal App.) (California
court not bound by custody decree of another state but may use its parens patriae power to
determine best interests of children), aff'd, 299 P.2d 329 (Cal App.) (1956); Sharpe v. Sharpe,
77 Ill. App. 2d 295, -,
222 N.E.2d 340, 342 (1966) (Illinois court modified custody decree
to give custody to paternal grandparents although Texas court had granted exclusive custody
to mother).
23. See supra note 22 (citing conflicting custody award cases).
24. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 542 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (jurisdictional
rules encourage dissatisfied parents to seize children and flee to alternate jurisdictions to obtain
new custody decrees); Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 248, 372 N.E.2d 4, 6-7, 402 N.Y.S.2d
168, 171 (1977) (New York court asserted jurisdiction over custody suit since abducted children
resided in New York despite concurrent custody hearing in New Jersey).
25. UNIF. CHmrL
CUSTODY JURISDICTION AcT, 9 U.L.A. 111, 113-14 (1979) (Commissioners'
Prefatory Note).
26. See Note, Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HAgv. L.
REv. 1156, 1198 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law]. The state's power to
intervene in the family arises from two distinct sources: the police power and the parenspatriae
power. Id. The police power derives from the state's inherent power to promote the public welfare
and prevent harm to its citizens. Id.; see, e.g., Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 548 (1917)
(dictum) (police power is appropriate extension of government power); Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905) (upholding compulsory vaccination law as valid exercise of police power).
The parenspatriaepower, however, is a limited paternalistic power of the state designed to protect members of society, such as children and the mentally incompetent, who cannot act in their
own best interest, See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (state has legitimate interest
under parens patriae power to provide care for emotionally disturbed citizens); O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583-84 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (states are vested with duty
to protect disabled citizens unable to act for themselves); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.
251, 257 (1972) (exercise of parens patriae power includes state's authority to protect infants
and mentally disturbed individuals); Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 56-58 (1890)
(state may exercise parenspatriaepower to protect persons, especially children, who cannot protect themselves). See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Il, 87 HAxv. L. REv. 1190, 1207-19 (1974) (defining state's authority under parenspatriae
doctrine to act on behalf of mentally ill persons).
27. See Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 312, 41 N.W.2d 60, 70 (1950) (state has duty
to oversee welfare of children within its borders). Three basic principles define and limit a state's
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in the outcome of a custody battle brought
tested custody adjudication the state court
on behalf of a child to determine the
alternatives. 29 In order to protect a child's

within its jurisdiction. "8 In a conasserted its parenspatriae power
merits of the child's custodial
interests, state courts often were

parens patriae power over children. Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at 1201. First,
the underlying concept of the parenspatriaepower presumes that children lack the maturity and
mental capacity to act on their own behalf. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
705 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (minor may lack sufficient maturity to make decision on use of birth control); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 102, 104-05 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting in relevant part) (minor is not competent
to reach decision to seek abortion); see also Wald, Children'sRights: A FrameworkforAnalysis,
12 U. C. D. L. REv. 255, 255-56 (1979) (children are presumed to lack social, legal and mental
capacity of adults). The Supreme Court has acknowledged, however, that children who are mature
and competent because of intellect or life experiences possess the same fundamental rights as
adults. See Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 3043, 3050 (1979) (minor has right to seek abortion);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976) (same); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (child has right to choose religion).
Under the second criterion of the parens patriae doctrine, the state in most circumstances
must show that the parents are unfit or unwilling to care adequately for their children before
the state may intervene. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform,
431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (state cannot intrude on
private realm of family without showing unfitness of parents); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
649-58 (1972) (state presumed that father of illegitimate child was unfit parent). In custody adjudication, however, the state does not have to show the existence of parental neglect before
the state may make a custody determination. See R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY & STATE 476 (1978).
State intervention into custody disputes does not infringe on the family's right to privacy because
the court has a duty to make the custody decision. Id.
The third criterion of the parens patriae doctrine limits the state's exercise of the parens
patriae power solely to further the best interests of the child. Developments in the Law, supra
note 26, at 1202. The best interests of the child standard provides that a court, before determin-

ing custody, must consider all factors relevant to a child's life.

UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

§ 402, 9A U.L.A. 197-98 (1979). Under the best interests standard relevant factors include
consideration of the wishes of the child and the child's parents as to custody arrangements, and
the interrelationship of the child and his parents. Id. § 402(l), (2) & (3). Furthermore, a court
must evaluate the child's social and educational adjustment, and the mental and physical health
of both parents and the child. Id. § 402(4), (5). In 1975, 31 states had statutes that specifically
provided for application of some form of the best interests of the child standard in custody determinations. See Mnookin, Child-CustodyAdjudication: JudicialFunctions in the Faceof Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB., Summer 1975, at 226, 236 n.45 [hereinafter cited as Child
Custody Adjudication] (citing state statutes using best interests standard in custody adjudication). Twelve other states provided no statutory best interests standard but relied on their courts
to develop judicial best interests standards. Id. at 237 nn.46-47. At least one court has upheld
the constitutionality of the best interests standard in custody cases. See Crahan v. N.R., 581
S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (use of best interests standard does not violate due process or equal protection clauses).
28. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (describing state's interest underparenspatriae
power in intervening in custody cases).
29. See H. CLARK, supra note 14, § 11.5. In custody disputes the court often has no tangible basis for determining which parent will be a better guardian. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD,
& A. SoLrNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 51-52 (1973) (effects of child rearing
practices are difficult to predict). A few commentators have noted that the best interests standard
should not be dispositive in child custody cases. See, e.g., R. MNOOKIN, supra note 28, at 264
(courts should emphasize stability of relationships and continuity of child's environment in granting custody orders); Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?, 29 RUTGERS
ACT
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willing to consider a parent's custody petition even if the parent had resorted
to abduction to bring the child before the court.30 Physical possession of a
child usually enabled a parent to choose the forum and attain the advantage
of a home state petitioner." Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) in 1968, an illegal child snatching did not
preclude a court from hearing a custody petition. 2 Thus, the state's ability
to assert its parens patriae power in child custody cases encouraged parents
33
to obtain possession of the child through any means possible.
The third factor that added to the child snatching problem stemmed from
the inconsequential criminal penalties for parental kidnapping. 3' Historically,
federal33 and state statutes 36 exempted parents from prosecution for abducting
their own children. 37 Prior to the kidnapping of Charles Lindbergh's son in
1932, no federal penalty for kidnapping existed. 38 After the Lindbergh Kidnapping, Congress enacted the federal kidnapping law, the Lindbergh Act. 39
The framers of the Lindbergh Act intended to impose federal criminal sancL. REv. 1117, 1153 (1976) (courts should evaluate psychological needs of child in reaching custody
decision); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNrT, supra, at 42-43 (court should consider child's
need for maintaining continuity in relationship with parent and child's need for speedy action
in determining custody issue). Nonetheless, most state statutes recognize that the best interests
of the child standard is dispositive in determining custody award. See Child Custody Adjudication, supra note 28, at 236-37 & nn.45-47 (listing state standards in child custody adjudication
and concluding that statutes demonstrate overwhelming acceptance of best interests standard).
30. See Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and
Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive Modifications, 65 CALIF.
L. REa. 978, 995 (1977) (conflicting state jurisdictional rules afford dissatisfied parents opportunity to relitigate custody in another forum); UNIF. CHMLD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AcT, 9 U.L.A.
111-13 (1979) (Commissioners' Prefatory Note) (legal system encourages child snatching).
31. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (describing jurisdictional advantages for
parent in physical possession of child in custody dispute).
32. See, e.g., In re Walker, 228 Cal. App. 2d 217, -,
39 Cal. Rptr. 243, 246 (1964)
(although mother brought child into California in defiance of Texas decree, California court
could assert jurisdiction since welfare of child required court intervention); Helton v. Crawley,
241 Iowa 296, -,
41 N.W.2d 60, 70 (1950) (child is within court's jurisdiction whenever child
is physically present before court). See generally H. C.AK, supra note 14, §§ 17.1, 17.2 (describing basis for jurisdiction in custody adjudication).
33. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (scope of parens patriaepower in child
custody cases).
34. See S. KArz, supra note 7, at 89 (remedies available in courts for child snatching are
inadequate). Traditionally, both federal and state law exempted parents from prosecution for
abducting their own children. See The Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (Supp. V
1981) (excluding parents from criminal liability); Katz, Legal Remedies for Child Snatching, 15
FAm. L.Q. 103, 105 (1981) (state criminal penalties are insufficient).
35. See The Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V 1981) (parents are exempt
from criminal penalties for kidnapping own child).
36. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (explaining lack of adequate state criminal
sanctions that in past fostered child snatching).
37. See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text (describing inconsequential criminal penalties
for child snatching).
38. See 75 CONG. REc. 13,296 (1932) (stating purposes underlying enactment of federal
criminal sanction for kidnapping).
39. See Act of June 22, 1932, ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326 (enacting Lindbergh Law).
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tions on abductions made by third parties for the purpose of ransom or reward
but expressly excluded parents from liability under the federal statute.4" The
rationale for the parental exemption clause of the Lindbergh Act derived from
the idea that even though a parent may have abducted a child, parents lack
the requisite intent for the crime of kidnapping. 4' The parental exemption under
42
federal law for the crime of kidnapping remains in force today.
Criminal legislation within the individual states also offered little deterrence to child abductors in custody disputes.43 Some state laws expressly excluded parents from prosecution for kidnapping their own children. 4 Many
early statutes, however, made no provision for the crime of kidnapping by
a parent.4" In those states in which kidnapping statutes did not specifically
include penalties for parental abductions, courts often granted immunity to
parental offenders. 6 Courts frequently explained or condoned a child snatching
by describing the abduction as a natural result of the parent's desire to be
47
with the child.
In response to the epidemic of child snatchings in the 1970's, the majority
of states have created criminal penalties for parental kidnapping.4" In some
states, legislatures merely added a child snatching provision to the existing
kidnapping law. 4 9 Other states enacted criminal penalties for the act of custodial
interference.5 0 Additionally, in order to establish a uniform system of jurisdic40. See id. (applying criminal sanctions only for abductions made for ransom or reward).
Congress later amended the Lindbergh Law to include criminal penalties for abductions made
for any purpose, but continued to exempt parents from prosecution for abducting their own
children. Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 301, 48 Stat. 781.
41. See 75 CoNG. REc. 13,296 (1932) (parents lack requisite criminal intent for kidnapping).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (Supp. V 1981).
43. See S. KATz,supra note 7, at 90 (states enacted kidnapping statutes to prevent abduction of children by third parties).
44. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2101 (1981) (kidnapping statute exempts parents from
prosecution for child snatching); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-14 (1971) (same).
45. See, e.g., OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 891 (West 1910) (language of statute does not
include penalty for parental kidnapping).
46. See Burns v. Commonwealth, 129 Pa. 138, 142, 18 A. 756, 757 (1889) (court granted
immunity to abducting parent, noting that statute's function was not to punish parent for asserting claim to possession of children).
47. See State v. Elliot, 171 La. 306, -,
131 So. 28, 30 (1930) (father is not guilty of
kidnapping for abduction of child since father merely desired to be reunited with child); People
v. Nelson, 322 Mich. 262, -, 33 N.W.2d 786, 788-89 (1948) (criminal intent to kidnap not
shown in abduction of child by father and father's agent); State v. Switzer, 80 Ohio St. 12, 14,
157 N.E.2d 466, 467-68 (1956) (although mother had temporary custody of child, father's abduction of child did not constitute child stealing because father lacked requisite criminal intent).
48. See P. HoFF & J. ScHULm N, supra note 2, at app. IV (listing current state statutory
criminal penalties for custodial interference or kidnapping).
49. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.45 (West 1966) (kidnapping by parent is felony);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2A (1978) (child abduction is misdemeanor); OHio REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2905.04 (Baldwin 1974) (child stealing by parent is felony if child is removed from state); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-2603 (1982) (concealment of child from lawful custodian is misdemeanor); VA.
CODE § 18.2-47 (1982) (abduction of child in violation of custody order is misdemeanor and
court may also fine abducting parent for contempt).
50. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2411 (1975) (interference with custody is felony if
child is taken out of state); CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983) (any violation
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tion among states, both federal and state governments have enacted legisla-

tion designed to deter child snatching and to facilitate interstate custody
agreements.' In light of the recent legislation, moreover, a state's authority2
to hear a custody case based solely on its parenspatiae power is limited.
In an effort to curb the growing rate of child abductions, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar
Association approved the UCCJA.5

The Commissioners created the UCCJA

in 1968 to ensure that only one state exercises jurisdiction over a single child
custody dispute." ' Currently forty-eight states and the District of Columbia
have adopted substantial portions of the UCCJA. 5
The UCCJA promotes consistency in child custody cases and prevents
of custody decree is misdemeanor); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 787.04 (West 1976) (removing child from
state in violation of court order or during pending custody proceeding is felony); N.C. GEM.
STAT. § 14-320.1 (1981) (transporting child out of state in violation of custody order is felony);
TEx. PENAL CODE ANm. § 25.03 (Vernon 1979) (interference with custody is felony if child removed
from state). But see ALA. CODE § 13A-6-45 (1982) (relatives are exempt from prosecution for
custodial interference); D.C. CODE At. § 22-2101 (1981) (although kidnapping is felony parents
are exempt from prosecution); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 509.070 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982) (relatives
are exempt from felony prosecution for custodial interference); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-14 (1977)
(parents are exempt from penalty for kidnapping or concealing child).
Currently, 14 states define custodial interference as a felony and 7 states classify custodial
interference exclusively as a misdemeanor. See Note, The Search for a Solution to ChildSnatching,
11 HOFTRA L. REV. 1073, 1107 n.243 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Solutions to Child Snatching]
(listing current state statutory penalties for custodial interference and child snatching). Twentyeight states have enacted both felony and misdemeanor laws for child snatching. Id. Some states
distinguish between felony and misdemeanor penalties for child snatching if the child is transported
across state lines. Id. No matter how state legislatures choose to define the offense of child snatching, the penalty is seldom as severe when a court convicts a parent rather than a third party.
Id.; see supra note 47 (describing cases in which courts declined to find offending parents guilty
of child snatching). For example, the typical criminal sanction applied in parental kidnapping
cases is a small fine or imprisonment for less than one year. See S. KATZ, supra note 7, at 94
(no recent conviction for child snatching has resulted in severe penalty).
51. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 116 (1979) (requiring interstate
recognition for custody decrees); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94
Stat. 3566, 3568 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. V 1981)) (extending full faith and credit
to custody decrees); 42 U.S.C. § 663 (Supp. V 1981) (authorizing use of Federal Parent Locater
Service in child snatching cases); 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (Supp. V 1981) (extending application of Fugitive
Felon Act to child abductions).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 57-69 (discussing limitations of states' jurisdiction
in custody cases since enactment of UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JtURISDICTION ACT (UCCJA)).
53. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 116 (1979); see Bodenheimer, The

Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1207 n.l (1969) (National Conference of Commissioners
approved UCCJA at annual meeting in July 1968).
54. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 113 (1979) (Commissioners'
Prefatory Note) (purpose of UCCJA is to reduce jurisdictional conflict); Dual Response to Child
Custody Problems, supra note 14, at 155-56 (analyzing purposes and tracing development of
UCCJA).
55. See Solutions to Child Snatching, supra note 50, at 1073-74 n.6 (listing state codifications of UCCJA). Only Massachusetts and Texas have not statutorily adopted the UCCJA. See
id. Massachusetts, however, has adopted the basic tenets of the UCCJA by judicial decree. See
Murphy v. Murphy, 404 N.E.2d 69, 72-74 (Mass. 1980) (adopting underlying principles of UCCJA).
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jurisdictional competition between states by limiting a state court's discretion

to exercise jurisdiction in a custody suit. 6 Under the UCCJA, a state must
meet one of four limited criteria before a court can exercise jurisdiction."
A state court can assert jurisdiction if the state is the child's home state,

8

9
or if the child pnd at least one parent have significant contacts with the state.
Under the significant contacts test, a court also must have available relevant

information concerning the child's family and upbringing. 60 In addition, a

state court may exercise jurisdiction if the child is abandoned or exposed to
harm, 6' or if no other state is willing or able to assert jurisdiction.62 Mere
presence of the child within the state, however, does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJA.6 3 Furthermore, the absence of the child

if the parents can meet the
from the forum does not preclude jurisdiction
64
home state or significant contacts tests.
The UCCJA also seeks to deter child abduction and prevent relitigation
of a custody suit in a new forum by limiting the situations in which a state
may modify another state's existing custody order. 5 Once a state court has
issued a custody decree, the UCCJA precludes all states operating under the
UCCJA from rehearing the case.6 Under the doctrine of comity,67 all state
56. See UNIx. CHIED CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A.

111,

114 (1979) (Commissioners'

Prefatory Note) (UCCJA restricts courts' eligibility to hear custody cases).
57. See id. § 3, 9 U.L.A. 116, 122 (jurisdictional requirements for custody cases under

UCCJA).
58. Id. § 3(a)l, 9 U.L.A. 116, 122; see id. § 2(5), 9 U.L.A. 116, 119 (defining home state
as state in which child has resided for six consecutive months prior to custody hearing).
59. Id. § 3(a)(2)(i), 9 U.L.A. 116, 122.
60. See id. § 3(a)(2)(ii), 9 U.L.A. 116 (court needs sufficient access to relevant information
on child's family and upbringing to make informed decision on child's custody alternatives).
61. See id. § 3(a)(3), 9 U.L.A. 116, 122 (state may assert jurisdiction on an emergency
basis if child is within the state and has been threatened, abandoned, abused, or mistreated).
62. See id. § 3(a)(4), 9 U.L.A. 116, 122 (UCCJA allows state to hear custody case when
no other forum is available).
63. See id. § 3(b), 9 U.L.A. 116, 122-23 (mere presence of child in state is not adequate
basis for UCCJA jurisdiction).
64. See id. § 3(c), 9 U.L.A. 116, 123 (child's physical appearance before court not prerequisite for jurisdiction).
65. See id. § 14, 9 U.L.A. 116, 153 (stating prerequisites for modification of custody petitions under UCCJA).
66. See id. § 14, 9 U.L.A. 116, 153. The UCCJA prohibits a state from modifying a custody
decree unless the state court that rendered the original decree did not meet the UCCJA's jurisdictional requirements. Id. at § 14(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 116, 153-54.
67. See Dual Response to Child Custody Problems, supra note 14, at 154 n.33. The doctrine of comity involves discretionary rather than mandatory recognition of judicial decrees between states. See, e.g., Fawkes v. Fawkes, 360 So. 2d 719, 720 (Ala. Civ. App.) (forum state
declined to recognize custody decree of sister state on basis of comity), ceri. denied, 360 So.
2d 721 (Ala. 1978); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 200 So. 2d 643, 643-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (forum
state extended comity recognition to custody order of another state); Metz v. Morley, 29 A.D.2d
462, 464-65, 289 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367 (1968) (in absence of full faith and credit requirement, forum
state granted recognition of custody decree on grounds of comity). Until the UCCJA mandated
the interstate recognition of custody decrees, comity provided an overly flexible and inconsistent
policy allowing liberal modification of custody decrees. See S. Krz, supra note 7, at 69-70.
The UCCJA conforms to the Supreme Court's position on extending comity to custody decrees.
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courts are requested to recognize original custody decrees. 6" Moreover, under

the UCCJA's clean hands doctrine, a state may deny jurisdiction to a petiabducted his child in order to litigate the custody issue in a
tioner who has
69
new forum.
Although the UCCJA attempts to remedy the defects in the judicial
system's determination of child custody cases, the effectiveness of the UCCJA

depends on its adoption in all fifty states.7" The two states that have chosen
not to enact the UCCJA continue to provide a haven for child snatchers. 7'
Furthermore, not all parents who abduct their children seek to relitigate the
custody order in a new jurisdiction." Some abducting parents are content to
abscond with the child across state lines and permanently conceal their

whereabouts." In extreme cases, the UCCJA offers no solution.74
Due to the escalating number of child snatchings during the 1970's, Con-

gress recognized the need for a uniform federal system in the adjudication
of child custody cases." In 1980, Congress addressed the problem of interstate
child abduction by passing the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA).7 '

The PKPA requires all states to enforce and not modify custody and visitaSee May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 535 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (despite Court's
unwillingness to require full faith and credit, states remain free to extend comity to custody decrees
of other states). Under the Supreme Court's interpretation, a state may recognize a custody decree
of another state even if the state issuing the original decree did not have personal jurisdiction
over one of the parties, so long as the due process requirements of notice and opportunity to
be heard are met. Id. Under the comity doctrine in May v. Anderson, a state court is not required
to recognize another state's custody decree but may do so as an exercise of discretion. Id.
68. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 13, 9 U.L.A. 116, 151 (1979) (requesting
recognition of out of state custody decrees); Dual Response to Child Custody Problems, supra
note 14, at 156-57 n.61 (UCCJA requires interstate recognition of custody decrees that meet jurisdictional requirements of UCCJA without demanding full faith and credit for all custody decrees).
69. See UNnF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 8, 9 U.L.A. 116, 142 (1979). The clean
hands doctrine prevents courts of equity from hearing cases in which the plaintiff's improper

conduct is the source of his claim. See D. DOBBS,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON REMEDIES

§ 2.4

(1973). A court may disregard the clean hands doctrine, however, if the court believes that the
abducting parent acted in the best interests of the child. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
ACT § 8(b), 9 U.L.A. 116, 142 (1979) (refusal of jurisdiction is mandatory in case of illegal abduction unless harm to child outweighs parental misconduct); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197-98 (1979) (defining best interests of child standard).

70. See UNIt.

CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION

ACT, 9 U.L.A. 111, 114 (1979) (Commissioners'

Prefatory Note) (success of UCCJA depends upon enactment of UCCJA in all jurisdictions).
71. See Child Snatching, supra note 3, at 7 (abducting parents may flee to states or territories which have not enacted UCCJA and successfully relitigate custody petition).
72. See People v. Hyatt, 18 Cal. App. 3d 621, 622, 96 Cal. Rptr. 156, 158 (1971) (abducting parent was willing to remain fugitive to retain possession of children).
73. See Solutions to Child Snatching, supra note 50, at 1112 (some abducting parents are
content to remain in hiding).
74. See id.; S. KATZ, supra note 7, at 93 (UCCJA cannot be effective if abducting parent
is content to conceal identity of self and child).
75. See infra note 77 and accompanying text (citing legislative purposes of Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)).
76. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566, 3568 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. V 1981) (jurisdictional requirements for custody adjudication); 42
U.S.C. § 663 (Supp. V 1981) (Parent Locator Service); 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (Supp. V 1981) (Fugitive
Felon Act)).
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tion decrees of other states." The PKPA defines the prerequisites for custody
jurisdiction by using standards similar to the guidelines of the UCCJA.78 For
full faith and credit to apply, the state issuing the custody order must have
been the child's home state for at least six months.79 If no state meets the
home state definition, a state may assert jurisdiction when the child and at
least one parent are present in the state and can prove significant connection
with the forum state.?' The petitioning parent also must present substantial
evidence describing the quality of the child's care and family life. 8 The PKPA
also requires states to recognize custody orders issued when another state exercises its emergency jurisdiction over a child.2 Moreover, states must respect
custody decrees issued by a state when no other state is willing or able to
assert jurisdiction.8 3 Additionally, the PKPA provides for a court's continuing jurisdiction over a custody case so long as the state fulfills one of the
above jurisdictional criteria."
The PKPA also authorizes the use of the Federal Parent Locator Service
to assist specified authorities8 in locating parents who have abducted their
children. 6 The Parent Locator Service relies on the information supplied by the
Social Security Administration, the Department of Defense, the Internal
Revenue Service, and other federal agencies to find parents who fail to make
child support payments.87 The PKPA authorizes the additional use of the Parent
Locator Service to aid in locating the kidnapping parent and abducted child. 88
77. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738(A)(a). By demanding full faith and credit for all custody orders,
the sponsors of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act intended to promote procedural stability
for children of divorced families, discourage forum shopping, and reduce jurisdictional competition between states. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566,
3568 (1980) (underlying policies of full faith and credit clause are consistent with legislative purposes of PKPA); supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing purposes of full faith and
credit clause).
78. See 28 U.S.C. 1738(A)(c) (defining jurisdictional requirements for custody adjudication under PKPA); UNIF. ChD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. 116, 122-23 (1979)

(promulgating jurisdictional guidelines for custody cases); supra text accompanying notes 57-64
(discussing jurisdictional rules of UCCJA).
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A) (Congress adopted UCCJA's definition of home state
in 1980 draft of PKPA); supra note 58 (definition of home state under UCCJA).
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B).
81. See id. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)(ii).
82. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(C).
83. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(D).
84. Id. § 1738A(d).
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 663 (explaining use of federal Parent Locator Service); Dual Response
to Child Custody Problems, supra note 14, at 157-58 n.69. The PKPA authorizes state Attorneys
General, United States Attorneys, state and federal law enforcement agencies, or the court of
jurisdiction to receive information provided by the Parent Locator Service. 42 U.S.C. § 663.
Parents seeking data on the whereabouts of an abducted child must contact one of the authorized
parties listed above. Id.
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 663.
87. See id.; Dual Response to Child Custody Problems, supra note 14, at 157-58 n.69
(describing functions of Parent Locator Service).
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 663. The Federal government has established guidelines for the use
of the Parent Locator Service in child snatching cases. See 46 Fed. Reg. 54,554 (1981) (codified
at 45 C.F.R. §§ 302.35, 303.15, -.69, -.70 (1982)).
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Finally, the PKPA extends the application of the Fugitive Felon Act to
parental kidnapping cases in states in which child snatching is a felony.89 The
Fugitive Felon Act authorizes the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), a
division of the Justice Department, to assist state authorities in the location
and apprehension of a fleeing parent and child.9" Before the FBI will intervene,
however, the child's home state must prove its willingness to extradite and
prosecute the abducting parent under the appropriate state laws." Once the
fugitive parent is apprehended, federal intervention will cease and prosecution will be resumed by state authorities. 2 The actual deterrent effect of the
Fugitive Felon Act is questionable in light of the Justice Department's reluctance to assist with the investigation of child snatching cases. 3 Because of
its limited resources, the Justice Department has been unwilling to intervene
in cases where the child's life was not in danger.' 4 In 1982, however, the Justice
Department agreed to drop its requirement that a child must be exposed to
95
harm before the FBI can become involved.
Some commentators have criticized the effectiveness of the PKPA since
Congress declined to include a provision making child snatching a federal
crime." The PKPA, as originally introduced in the Senate in 1978, defined
the detention of a minor child by a parent as a federal misdemeanor.' The
Senate rejected the original PKPA bill because of concerns that the imposition of a federal criminal penalty would circumscribe the authority of the in89. 18 U.S.C. § 1073.
90. See id. (authorizing intervention of Justice Department in child snatching cases).
91. See Solutions to Child Snatching, supra note 50, at 1106 (Fugitive Felon Act is not
substitute for state's extradition laws).
92. See id. at 1106 (state must prosecute abducting parent as felon under applicable state
statute).
93. See October 1981 CongressionalHearingsRegardingFailureof Justice Department to
Implement the ParentalKidnapping Prevention Act, 127 CONG. REc. 11,811 (daily ed. Oct. 21,
1981) [hereinafter cited as October 1981 Hearings] (statement of Sen. M. Wallop) (Justice Department reluctantly applies Fugitive Felon Act to child snatching cases). Of the 743 child snatching
complaints received by the Justice Department from January 1, 1980 to December 30, 1980, the
Justice Department authorized F.B.I. involvement in only 48, and arrested only 22 fugitive parents.
See The Department of Justice, Report on Implementation of ParentalKidnapping Prevention
Act of 1980, 10 FAm. LAW R=p. (BNA) 1099-1100 (December 12, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Department of Justice Report].
94. See October 1981 Hearings,supra note 93, at 11,812 (noting Justice Department's reluctance to intervene in child snatching cases). The Justice Department traditionally has viewed child
snatching as a domestic relations problem rather than as a criminal matter. Id.
95. See id. at 11,815-16 (letter to Sen. A. Cranston from Edward C. Schnults, Deputy
Attorney General, redefining Justice Department guidelines for intervention in child snatching
cases). As a result of the Justice Department's policy change, parental kidnapping felonies are
currently handled on the same basis as other fugitive felon cases. See Department of Justice Report,
supra note 93, at 1100. The Justice Department reports that of the 230 requests received in the
first nine months of 1983, the FBI intervened in 182 child snatching cases, and arrested 85 fugitive
parents. Id.
96. See Solutions to Child Snatching, supra note 50, at I111 (strong uniform federal law
criminalizing child snatching is needed to effectively deter parental kidnapping).
97. See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. R~c. 499-500 (1978) (imposing federal
criminal penalties for concealment of child from custodial parent).
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dividual states to handle child snatching cases." The Senate also rejected a
1979 PKPA bill which imposed federal misdemeanor penalties upon a parent,
relative, or agent of the parent who abducted a child in violation of a custody
decree and transported the child across state lines. 99 The final version of the

PKPA eliminated the criminalization proposal and substituted a compromise
provision extending the Fugitive Felon Act to child snatching cases.' The
elimination of a criminal penalty for child snatching from the PKPA reflects

the Senate's concern that a federal sanction might unduly interfere with state
power.' Thus, the burden falls on the individual states to enact stricter criminal
penalties for child snatching.1 "

Although a criminal penalty can neither guarantee a parent the recovery
of his child nor provide compensation for emotional and monetary losses,
a more stringent criminal sanction may provide an effective deterrent to future
child snatchers.' 3 If the likelihood of a prison sentence for child snatchers
is increased, abducting parents might choose to settle custody disputes by ap-

propriate legal means rather than risk a jail term."' Moreover, if the child
snatcher received a jail sentence, he or she might be forced to return or reveal
the whereabouts of the abducted child.'0° The current criminal court system,
however, provides little recourse to the custodial parent seeking the return
of an abducted child. 6
In the past, custodial parents seeking an effective civil remedy for child
snatching also found limited remedies in the courts.'0 7 Traditionally, state courts
98. See October 1981 Hearings,supra note 93, at 11,814 (statement of Sen. A. Cranston)
(Congressional conferees were reluctant to establish federal offense for child snatching without
first attempting to determine whether Justice Department intervention through Fugitive Felon
Act would effectively assist states in prosecution of child snatchers).
99. S. 105, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CoNG,. REc. 739, 741 (1979).
100. See 126 CoNG. REc. 15,944-45 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1980) (statement of Sen. D. DeConcini) (suggesting addition of Fugitive Felon Act to PKPA as compromise proposal).
101. See Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction,Recognition, & Enforcement, 66
MINN. L. REv. 711, 765-66 (1982) (compromise provision inserted in PKPA to avoid circumscribing authority of states).
102. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1312 (Supp. 1982). Georgia has created felony sanctions
for parents who remove their children from the state of Georgia in violation of a custody order.
See id. Moreover, Georgia applies the same felony sanctions against parents who abduct their
children from other states and bring the abducted children into Georgia. See id.
103. See Solutions to Child Snatching, supra note 50, at 1111 (imposing stricter statutory
penalties against abducting parents may deter child snatching). But see S. KArz, supra note 7,
at 89 (criminal sanctions may punish abducting parent but cannot ensure return of child to custodial
parent).
104. See Solutions to Child Snatching, supra note 50, at 1111 (recommending that states
amend child snatching statutes to impose stricter penalties).
105. See id. at 1111 (noting benefits of stricter criminal penalties in deterring child snatching).
106. See, e.g., People v. Hyatt, 18 Cal. App. 3d 618, 626-27, 96 Cal. Rptr. 156, 158 (1971)
(jury found abducting father guilty of child snatching but granted sentence of probation); State
v. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624, 625-26 (Minn. 1978) (imposition of felony charge for child
snatching declared unconstitutional).
107. Lansing & Sherman, The LegalResponse to Child Snatching, 7 J. Juv. LAw. 16, 18-19
(1983). Traditional civil remedies for custodial parents included citations for contempt of court
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discouraged civil actions for child abduction.0 Courts defined the abduction
of a child as an infringement on property rights and granted recovery only
if a parent could prove damages for loss of the child's services. '0 9 State courts
generally denied recovery for mental anguish based solely on the loss of a
0
child's companionship."
Until recently, federal courts denied jurisdiction to parents seeking civil
recovery against child abductors.I" Federal courts reasoned that tort actions
for child snatching fell within the domestic relations exception to diversity
jurisdiction and therefore were barred from federal jurisdiction. "2 The domestic
relations exception is a judicially created limitation which precludes federal
courts from hearing disputes involving family matters." 3 Relying on the
and writs of habeas corpus. Id. Both writs of habeas corpus and contempt of court citations
were ineffective outside of the jurisdiction of the state court that issued the custody decree. Id. at 19.
108. See, e.g., Wilborn v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 828, 829, 337 P.2d 65, 66 (1959) (in
absence of custody order, parent's abduction of child is not subject to penalty). See generally
S. KATZ, supra note 7, at 98 (courts rarely grant civil liability in child abduction cases).
109. See, e.g., Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283, 284, 78 S.E. 222, 224 (1913) (court awarded
damages to father for expenses incurred in recovering abducted child and injury stemming from
loss of child's services when mother abducted daughter); Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 312-13
(1877) (grandfather allowed to recover damages for loss of grandchildren's services); Rice v. Nickerson, 91 Mass. 478, 480-81 (1864) (father recovered damages for expenses incurred in recovering
child as property).
110. See supra note 109 (citing cases in which courts awarded damages to custodial parents
for loss of abducted child's services). But see Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 479, 169 N.E. 650,
653 (1930). In Pickle v. Page, the court granted damages to a father for mental anguish after
the mother abducted the couple's children. Id. The court recognized a cause of action based
on the father's emotional distress and did not require that the father prove injury stemming from
the loss of the children's services. Id.
111. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (state court is proper forum for domestic
relations questions); H. CLAR, supra note 21, at 572 (law of domestic relations traditionally
has been exclusive province of states).
112. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3609
(1975) (defining domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction).
113. See U.S. CONST. art. III, section 2, clause 1. The United States Constitution grants
Congress the authority to vest jurisdiction in the federal courts in controversies between citizens
of different states or between a citizen of a state and an alien. Id. In the Judiciary Act of 1789
Congress authorized the federal courts to assert jurisdiction in cases based on diversity of citizenship. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20 § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1976)). The domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction provides that diversity
jurisdiction does not allow federal courts the authority to grant divorces, determine alimony,
or adjudicate child custody cases. See, e.g., Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 843 (1st Cir. 1981)
(in absence of contrary action by Supreme Court or Congress, domestic relations exception bars
federal court from resolving custody disputes); Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1087 (4th Cir. 1980)
(Congress has not given federal courts authority over domestic relations cases); Wilkins v. Rogers,
581 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1978) (subject of domestic relations governed by laws of individual
states not by federal law). The domestic relations exception first appeared in two early Supreme
Court cases. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 596-97 (1890) (power of federal courts to grant
writs of habeas corpus does not apply to child custody cases); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 582, 597 (1858) (disclaiming federal jurisdiction in cases determining divorce or alimony
issues). The domestic relations exception continues to limit diversity jurisdiction despite criticism
from at least one Circuit Court judge. See Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1027 (3d Cir.
1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (disputing valid basis for domestic relations exception).
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domestic relations exception, federal courts have deferred to state courts in

cases involving marriage, divorce, alimony, or custody issues." In a significant departure from the domestic relations exception, however, several federal

circuits recently have recognized tort actions for child snatching." 5 For example, in Wasserman v. Wasserman, ' 6 the Fourth Circuit held that a federal

court may exercise diversity jurisdiction in a child snatching suit involving
common-law torts.' '
The Wasserman case involved the abduction of three children by their
father after the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Maryland, had awarded
custody to the mother."I8 The children's mother initiated a tort suit in federal
court seeking damages for child enticement, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and civil conspiracy. 19 The United States District Court for the District
of Maryland dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 2 "
The district court described the suit as a dispute involving child custody and
thus barred from the jurisdiction of the federal courts by the domestic rela-

tions exception.' 2' The Fourth Circuit in Wasserman reversed and remanded,

holding that the complaint, which alleged generally cognizable common-law

22
torts of child enticement and intentional infliction of emotional distress,'
did not require the court to intervene in a marriage relationship or determine
the status of the child's custody.' 23 The Wasserman court reasoned that the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not dependent on a family
24

relationship and therefore not within the domestic relations exception.

The Wasserman case did not require the Fourth Circuit to rule on a custody
issue since neither party sought to challenge or modify the existing custody
114. See Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599, 605 (5th Cir. 1981) (Brown, J., dissenting) (federal
courts defer to state courts in domestic relations cases because state has more fundamental interest in resolving disputes concerning private lives of citizens), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 3504 (1982);
Bell v. Bell, 411 F. Supp. 716, 718 (W.D. Wash. 1976) (federal courts should avoid conflict with
state administration of domestic relations law). Thus, federal courts generally deny jurisdiction
in domestic relations cases even if parties have satisfied diversity jurisdiction requirements. See
13 C. VRIGHT, A. MrER, E. COOPER, supra note 112,

§

3609 (1975).

115. See infra notes 116-144 and accompanying text (federal courts awarded damages for
child snatching).
116. 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.), cert. denied., 103 S. Ct. 372 (1982).
117. See 671 F.2d at 834.
118. See id.at 833.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id.at 834 n.2 (listing generally cognizable torts for child snatching); see also infra
notes 135-185 and accompanying text (describing basis for recent tort recoveries in Fifth, Seventh
and District of Columbia Circuits).
123. 671 F.2d at 835. In Wasserman v. Wasserman, the Fourth Circuit did not rule on the
merits of the plaintiff's tort claims but remanded the case to the district court for disposition.
See id. at 834. The plaintiff named as parties to the suit her ex-husband's present wife, his parents,
and the attorneys who represented the ex-husband. Id. at 833. The plaintiff alleged that for four
months the defendants prevented the three Wasserman children from contacting or returning
to the plaintiff and that the defendants concealed the children's whereabouts from the plaintiff. Id.
124. See id. at 834-35.
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'
Because the Wasserman suit did not demand the resolution of a
decree. 25
domestic relations issue, the Fourth Circuit asserted that the federal district
court could not avoid hearing the tort action in Wasserman merely because
the case involved intrafamily issues.126 In an earlier case, Cole v. Cole,'27 the
Fourth Circuit held that not all family disputes fall directly into the domestic
relations exception.' 28 In Cole the Fourth Circuit upheld the right of a former
husband to maintain an action against his ex-wife in a federal district court
for malicious prosecution. 2 9 The Cole court ruled that the plaintiffs suit was
not barred by the domestic relations exception because the federal court was
not required to adjust or redefine the family status. 3 Reaffirming its analysis
in Cole, the Fourth Circuit held in Wasserman that a federal district court
must examine the nature of the claims asserted in each case to determine if
any true domestic relations issues exist.' 3' Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit ruled
that Cole compelled the federal district court to hear the Wasserman suit.' 32
The significance of the Wasserman opinion is the Fourth Circuit's determination that the domestic relations exception does not automatically bar a parent's
tort claims for child abduction.' 33
The District of Columbia Circuit followed the Wasserman decision in Bennett v. Bennett,'3" addressing sua sponte the jurisdictional issue presented in
the case.' 35 In Bennett, a divorced father sought monetary damages and injunctive relief against his former wife for the abduction of their child.' 3 6 Noting
full support for the reasoning in the Wasserman case, the Bennett court held
that although the federal district court had jurisdiction to hear a tort action
for damages in a child stealing case, the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to
provide injunctive relief. 3 The District of Columbia Circuit reasoned that

125. See id. at 835.
126. See id. at 834.
127. 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980).
128. Id. at 1088.
129. Id. at 1089. In Cole v. Cole, the plaintiff brought suit against his ex-wife for arson,
conspiracy, abuse of process, conversion, and malicious prosecution. Id. at 1085-87. The district
court dismissed the claims because the case fell within the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 1084. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the Cole case did not
present any true domestic relations issues. Id. at 1088-89.
130. See id. at 1088-89.
131. See 671 F.2d at 834-35.
132. Id. at 834. The United States District Court of the Western District of Virginia reaffirmed the Wasserman holding in Acord v. Parsons. 551 F. Supp. 115 (W.D. Va. 1982). The
federal district court held in Acord that the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction
does not bar a father's tort claim alleging child enticement, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and civil conspiracy even though the action arose from a child custody dispute. Id. at 118.
133. 671 F.2d at 834.
134. 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
135. Id. at 1041-42.
136. Id. at 1040. In Bennett v. Bennett, a divorced father brought action seeking monetary
damages in the amount of $525,000 and injunctive relief against his former wife who had abducted the parties' two children. Id. The children's father sought to enjoin the mother from
interfering with the custody rights of her former husband. Id. at 1042. The lower court dismissed
the action and the father filed an appeal. Id. at 1041.
137. Id. at 1042-43.
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a federal court is entirely competent to hear traditional tort claims based on
the unlawful harboring of a child.' 38 The District of Columbia Circuit, however,
refused to hear the request for injunctive relief because such a request would
require the federal court to determine the parents' present and future rights
to custody and visitation.' 39 In the Bennett case, both parents had obtained
valid custody decrees.' 4° The Bennett court noted that in the absence of an
overriding federal interest,' 4' a federal court should refrain from interfering
4 2
in a custody dispute involving two conflicting state court custody orders.'
Further, the District of Columbia Circuit stressed that Congress, in enacting
the PKPA, deliberately refrained from creating a role for the federal courts
in determining child custody issues. 4 3 Thus, the Bennett court held that federal
courts do not have the power to grant injunctive relief in child snatching
cases. '4The Supreme Court recently declined to rule on whether the presence
of custody issues in parental kidnapping tort actions should deny federal sub4
ject matter jurisdiction to child snatching cases. 1
The recent trend in the federal courts to grant jurisdiction in child snatching
cases has expanded the nature of tort actions for child abductions. ,46 In exercising jurisdiction in child snatching cases, federal courts have not limited tort
actions to a single theory of liability.' 47 The United States Courts of Appeals
for the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have recognized a number of tort
theories for child stealing such as the intentional infliction of emotional distress,
138. See id. at 1042-44.

139. See id. at 1042-43.
140. Id. at 1041.
141. See id. at 1042. At least one federal district court has granted jurisdiction in a domestic
relations case because of a compelling federal interest. See Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift,
195 F. Supp. 857, 865 (D. Md. 1961). In Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra, an alien, the Lebanese
ambassador to Iran, brought suit in the federal district court of Maryland to regain custody of
his daughter. Id at 859. The Adras' 14 year old daughter resided in Maryland with her mother
and step-father, the co-defendants. Id. The plaintiff alleged that Moslem law entitled him to
custody of his daughter when she reached nine years of age. Id. The plaintiff also contended
that the child's mother deliberately withheld custody and moved the child from country to country, concealing the child's true name and identity. Id. Although the Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra
case involved domestic relations issues, the federal district court asserted jurisdiction because
of the overriding federal interest in resolving questions of international law. Id.at 865.
142. See 682 F.2d at 1043 n.5.
143. See id. at 1043.
144. See id. at 1044. In commenting upon the limited role of federal courts in family relations cases, the Bennett dissent pointed out the inconsistency of awarding monetary damages
but denying injunctive relief. See id. at 1045 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). The dissent noted the ineffectiveness of the Bennett court's approval of monetary damages
yet denial of the means necessary to secure the return of the abducted child. Id.
145. See Hirschfeld v. Clunie, No. 81-5502 (D. Ariz. Oct. 18, 1982) (tort action for child
snatching), aff'd, 692 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Hirschfeld v.
Dreyer, 51 U.S.L.W. 3926 (Apr. 19, 1983) (No. 82-1824), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 74 (1983).
146. See infra text accompanying notes 149-182 (discussion of Fenslagev.Dawkins,Kajtazi
v. Kaitazi and Lloyd v. Loeffier).
147. See P. Ho' & J. ScumAN, supra note 2, at 1413 (judicially recognized tort theories
for child snatching include loss of care, custody and companionship, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, civil conspiracy, unlawful imprisonment, and child enticement).
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outrageous conduct, and civil conspiracy.148 In many cases, federal courts of
appeals have affirmed awards for compensatory damages in excess of 100,000
dollars.' 4 9 Moreover, courts have permitted large punitive damage awards in
child snatching suits based on common-law tort theories and on the tort of
intentional interference with lawful custody of a child.'
In Kajtazi v. Kajtazi,'3 ' one of the first child snatching suits to win punitive

damages in a federal court, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York awarded punitive damages when a father abducted his
infant son from the child's mother in California in violation of a temporary
custody decree.' 52 Shortly thereafter, during a hearing in New York on the
mother's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the father fled with the boy
to Yugoslavia.

53

The mother, individually and as guardian ad litem for her

54

son,' commenced an action for damages in United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York, against her former husband and members
of his family who had assisted the former husband with the child snatching.III
The court awarded the mother general and punitive damages in the amount
of 176,430 dollars based on the tort theories of false imprisonment and intentional infliction of mental suffering.'3 6 The Kajtazi court reasoned that the
was sufficiently
father's conduct in abducting the child from his mother
5
outrageous to justify the award of punitive damages. 1 7
The Kajtazi case demonstrates a federal court's willingness to hear child

snatching cases and to extend tort liability to parents who abduct their children
in violation of court orders.I 8 As the Kajtazi case indicates, in most tort suits
for parental kidnapping the validity of the custody decree is not at issue. 1 9
148. See infra text accompanying notes 149-187 (discussion of recent circuit courts' decisions allowing damages for child snatching).
149. See Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107, 1109 (5th Cir. 1980) (federal court awarded
mother $65,000 in compensatory damages for abduction of child and assessed additional $65,000
against abducting father's co-conspirators); Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 21-22 (E.D.N.Y.
1978) (federal district court awarded custodial mother $14,950 for loss of child's services, $5,000
in legal fees, and $60,980 for false imprisonment of abducted child).
150. See infra text accompanying notes 163-187 (analysis of tort claims for child snatching
based on

§

700 of

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS).

151. 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
152. Id. at 17. In Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, the father abducted his child and fled from California
to New York where the father's large extended family resided. Id.
153. Id. During the habeas corpus hearing in Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, the defendant's father and
brother falsely denied knowledge of the abducted child's whereabouts. Id.
154. Id. at 17. As the Kajtazi court noted, the Superior Court of Orange County, California
previously had awarded the plaintiff custody of her son. Id.
155. See id. at 18. The Kajtazi court dismissed a tort claim for prima facie tort as being
duplicative of other tort theories. Id. at 21. The Kajtazi court also denied a cause of action based
on civil conspiracy since the substantive tort of civil conspiracy does not exist in New York. Id.
156. See id. at 19-20; see also supra note 149 (listing compensatory damages in Kajtazi v.
Kaitazt).
157. See id. at 20-21. The Kajtazi court awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in punitive damages
for the intentional infliction of emotional suffering. Id. at 20.
158. See id. at 18-20.
159. See id. at 17 (validity of plaintiff's custody decree in Kajtazi not contested); see also
Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir. 1982) (both parties conceded existence
of one valid custody decree), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 372 (1982).
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Tort actions for child snatching, therefore, will not require federal courts to
60
determine domestic relations issues such as the custodial rights of the parents.
Because the typical tort suit will not involve domestic relations issues, federal
courts are no less competent than state courts to hear tort actions for parental
kidnapping. 6 ' Thus, the federal court system can provide a willing and
knowledgeable forum for aggrieved parents who choose to initiate a child
snatching suit.62
In addition to allowing common-law torts for child snatching, a few federal
courts have recognized that child abduction constitutes the actionable tort of
unlawful interference with legal custody of a child.' 63 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts (Restatement) defines as a tort the actions of one who denies custody
to a parent legally entitled to the guardianship of a child.' 64 Section 700 of
the Restatement provides that a custodial parent may recover damages for
mental distress from persons who wrongfully deprive the parent of custody
of a child. 65 For example, in Fenslage v. Dawkins,' 66 the Fifth Circuit affirmed
a 130,000 dollar award of compensatory and exemplary damages based on

the torts of intentional infliction of mental anguish,' 67 civil conspiracy, and

wrongful interference with custody of a child.' 6 8 The Fifth Circuit held that
the district court properly awarded damages to the legal custodian based on
69

the principles set forth in section 700 of the Restatement.'
The Seventh Circuit in Lloyd v. Loeffler'7 ° also expressly cited section
700 of the Restatement as one of the grounds for affirming an award of
damages for abducting and concealing a child.

'7 '

In Lloyd, a father gained

160. See 671 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir. 1982) (tort action for child snatching does not require
court to determine custodial rights of parents).
161. See Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1088-89 (4th Cir. 1980) (federal courts should not
ignore duty to hear tort cases involving domestic relations problems).
162. See, e.g., Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 21-22 (E.D. N.Y. 1978) (Eastern District
Court of New York provided appropriate forum for tort action for child snatching and awarded
more than $170,000 in damages); Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (E.D. Wis.) (federal
district court of Wisconsin awarded custodial father $70,000 in compensatory damages in child
snatching suit including amounts for private detectives and attorneys' fees), aff'd, 694 F.2d 489,
491 (7th Cir. 1982).
163. See infra text accompanying notes 164-187 (discussion of tort for child snatching based
on § 700 of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS).
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977) (defining tort of unlawful interference
with custody of child).
165. See id. § 700 comment g (parents may recover for emotional distress suffered from
child's abduction).
166. 629 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1980). In Fenslage, a Texas court awarded custody of two
children to the mother. Id. at 1108. The mother subsequently moved to Arizona but agreed to
allow the children to spend summer vacation with their father in Texas. Id. Instead of returning
the children after a visit, the father fled with the children to Canada. Id.
167. Id. at 1109.
168. Id. at 1109-10.
169. See id. at 1109-10 (affirming Fenslage court's decision to award damages for child abduction); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977) (establishing tort of unlawful interference
with custody of child).
170. 539 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982).

171. See 694 F.2d at 496.
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custody of his daughter after a year-long custody battle in Maryland. 7 2 At
the end of a court-ordered visitation period the mother refused to return the
child. 7 3 The father instituted a suit against the child's mother, step-father,
and maternal grandparents for conspiring to commit the tort of unlawful interference with the custody of a parent.' 7 4 The Seventh Circuit upheld the
district court's conclusion that the defendants had violated a duty to the
plaintiff-father based on the language of section 700 of the Restatement, the
existence of a state criminal statute penalizing custodial interference, and the
trend in other jurisdictions of allowing tort suits for child abduction.17 The
Lloyd court held the grandparents liable as joint tortfeasors for assisting the
mother in concealing the whereabouts of the abducted child.' 76
In Lloyd, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the awards of 70,000 dollars in
compensatory damages and 25,000 dollars in punitive damages.' 77 The federal
district court in Lloyd had stipulated that the punitive damage award would
increase at the rate of 2,000 dollars per month until the mother returned
the abducted child. 7 1 In dictum to the Lloyd case, however, the Seventh Circuit questioned the authority of a federal district court to award escalating
cumulative damages.' 7 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that by imposing
cumulative damages against the mother, the district court was in essence determining which parent should have legal custody. 8 ' The Seventh Circuit
analogized applying cumulative damages in a child snatching case to awarding injunctive relief, which the Bennett decision prohibited.' 8 ' The Seventh
Circuit, however, affirmed the entire damages decree in Lloyd because the
Loefflers did not challenge the cumulative damages award.'I 2 Although some
courts have recognized that section 700 provides valid grounds for a child
snatching suit, plaintiffs rarely have employed section 700 of the Restatement
as a basis for liability in child snatching cases.'
Section 700 of the Restatement provides a wide basis of tort liability for
parents deprived of legal custody of a child.' 84 Liability under section 700
172. Id. at 490.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id.at 496.
176. See id.at 497.
177. See id.at 494.
178. See 539 F. Supp. at 1005.
179. See 694 F.2d at 494 (questioning validity of Lloyd court's subject matter jurisdiction
to impose escalating damages).
180. Id.
181. Id.; see also Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (District of
Columbia Circuit Court affirmed denial of injunctive relief requesting return of abducted children
to custodial father).
182. See 694 F.2d at 494.
183. See Note, Abduction of Child by Non-CustodialParent:Damagesfor Parent'sMental
Distress,46 Mo. L. Ra,. 829, 838 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Damages] (§ 700 of RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS infrequently used as grounds for recovery in child snatching cases).
184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 comment g (1977) (custodial parents are
allowed to recover any reasonable expenses incurred from illegal abduction of child, including
damages for mental anguish).
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can include damages for loss of the child's services, costs of locating the child,
recovery of the child's medical expenses resulting from the abduction, and
damages for mental distress to the parent." 5 The Courts of Appeals' analyses
in Fenslage and Lloyd, combined with the large monetary awards for actual
and punitive damages, may promote the section 700 remedy as a valid cause
of action in child snatching cases.' 8 6 In addition, federal courts have used section 700 of the Restatement to assess damages not only against abducting
parents but also against individuals who assist in concealing or detaining an
17
abducted child. 8
By initiating a civil court action, the custodial parent's primary goal is
to recover his or her child.' 88 As the Lloyd and Kajtazi cases demonstrate,
tort actions cannot guarantee the return of an unlawfully detained child'89
but can grant the custodial parent a means of recovering actual costs incurred
in the search for a missing child. 9 Recoverable costs can include attorney
fees, travel costs, detective fees, telephone calls, advertising, and interest on
loans obtained to finance the search.' 9 ' By imposing additional monetary

burdens on the abducting parent, courts may force the child snatching parent
to return or reveal the location of the abducted child.' 92 Many courts also
have awarded compensatory damages for mental anguish in child snatching
cases. 93 In addition, courts frequently award punitive damages in cases of
185. See id.
186. See Damages, supranote 183, at 838 (advocating use of § 700 of
OF TORTS

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

as cause of action in child abduction tort suits).

187. See, e.g., Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 18 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (damages assessed
against abducting father, father's brother, and step-father for child abduction); Lloyd v. Loeffler,
539 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (E.D. Wis.) (maternal grandparents of abducted child held liable as joint
tortfeasors with child's mother for aiding in concealment of child), aff'd, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.
1982). In a recent case, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado assessed
$1.7 million actual damages and $4.2 million punitive damages against the company that produces the Phil Donahue Show. See News Notes, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2452 (May 24, 1983).
The law suit charged Phil Donahue and Multi-media Program Productions, Inc. (Multi-Media)
with conspiracy, negligence, outrageous conduct, and interfering with the parent-child relationship. Id. The Phil Donahue Show had broadcasted an interview with the plaintiff's former husband who had kidnapped and concealed the couple's child. Id. The suit charged that the defendants knew the child had been kidnapped and willfully assisted the fugitive father in concealing
the child. Id. The court, citing § 700 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, held Multi-Media
liable for inducing a minor to leave or not to return home and wrongful interference with custody
of a child. Id. Although the suit named Donahue as a co-conspirator, charges against Donahue
and other members of Donahue's staff subsequently were dropped. Id.
188. See S. KArz, supra note 7, at 101 (goal of tort remedy is return of abducted child).
189. See Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (E.D. Wis.) (court assessed punitive
damages against abducting mother but court could not command return of child), aff'd, 694
F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(court denied injunctive relief to custodial father requesting return of abducted child).
190. See 694 F.2d at 490 (custodial father awarded costs incurred in search for abducted child).
191. See P. Hor & J. SCHULMAN, supra note 2, at 14-4 (most expenses incurred in search
for missing child are recoverable).
192. See id. at 14-5.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 146-162 (discussing damages for emotional distress
in child abductions).
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long term concealment of a child.' 94 By imposing punitive damages, courts
have recognized the severe emotional distress suffered by the custodial parent
when the abducting parent refuses to disclose a child's whereabouts.'"
Moreover, when a court applies an escalating amount as part of a punitive
damage award, the court creates a monetary incentive to child snatchers to
reveal the abducted child's location.' 96 Punitive damages have the ancillary
benefit of acting as a deterrent to future child snatchers.' 9 7 The threat of
monetary sanctions may encourage a potential child snatcher to seek custody
through the proper legal channels rather than to engage in illegal self-help. 9
MARY MADIGAN

194. See Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (E.D. Wis.) (punitive damages awarded
to father when mother refused to return or reveal location of abducted daughter), aff'd, 694
F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982).
195. See 694 F.2d at 491.
196. See id. at 494. The Lloyd court confirmed the judgment ordering the mother and stepfather to pay $2,000 per month until they returned the Lloyd child. Id. But see supra text accompanying notes 179-182 (discussing Lloyd court's reluctance to affirm cumulative damages award).
197. See Solutions to Child Snatching, supra note 50, at 1116 (if courts continue to impose
large punitive damage awards, noncustodial parents may refrain from child snatching).
198. See supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text (discussing appropriate legal means to
institute or modify custody decrees).

